Threat actors are embedding prompt injection payloads in third-party LLM plugins and data sources to hijack AI agent actions, exfiltrate data, and pivot within enterprise environments.
Threat actors are embedding prompt injection payloads in third-party LLM plugins and data sources to hijack AI agent actions, exfiltrate data, and pivot within enterprise environments.
A newly attributed state-sponsored threat actor is systematically targeting AI development infrastructure to poison training datasets and embed persistent backdoors in commercially deployed models.
Research demonstrates that LLMs with large context windows can be reliably jailbroken by embedding hundreds of fictitious dialogues before the target request — a technique that scales with context length and bypasses standard safety training.
A server-side request forgery vulnerability in Ollama allows attackers on the local network to read arbitrary files and make requests to internal services via the model pull endpoint. Affects all versions prior to 0.3.8.
New research demonstrates that backdoor behaviours introduced into LLMs during fine-tuning can persist through subsequent safety alignment procedures, including RLHF and adversarial training, posing significant supply chain risks.